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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Lower Court Civil No. 920902292 
-vs- Case No. 92 0474 
TONY DONNELLY, Priority Classification 14b 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPEAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter "defendant" or "Donnelly") 
submits the following as his brief of appellant herein: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final order and judgment herein 
is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The matter below is an action for injunctive relief, which 
resulted in action for a finding of contempt against the 
defendant for violation of that restraining order. The orders 
appealed from are the order finding the defendant in contempt for 
violation of the injunction, the order denying the defendant 
relief from that finding of contempt, and the judgment entered 
against the defendant for attorney's fees pursuant to the finding 
of contempt. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following are the issues presented on appeal: 
a. Did the trial court err in making its judgment that the 
defendant was in contempt of a prior order of the court? 
b. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
defendant's motion to be relieved from the order holding 
defendant in contempt? 
c. Did the trial court err in awarding plaintiff 
attorney's fees in this action? 
d. Was the "Temporary Restraining Order" issued by the 
court below so vague in its requirement that the defendant "act 
reasonably" that defendant was incapable of knowing what duty the 
court expected of him or of conforming his conduct to this prior 
order of the court? 
e. If the prior injunction of the trial court was not so 
vague as to be unenforceable, did the defendant's conduct 
actually violate the order? 
f. Did defendant have proper notice of the contempt 
hearing? 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78, Chapter 32, may be 
determinative of the outcome in this appeal. Also, the following 
case law is determinative or may be determinative in this action: 
Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 
(Utah 1988); and Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 544 (Utah 1981). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this appeal as to all issues 
presented on appeal is a reversal of error standard, since the 
issue presented is one of law. Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association v. Labrumr supra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the final judgment and order entered in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge 
presiding, which found defendant to be in contempt of court for 
violating an injunction, and then denied his motion for relief 
from that finding of contempt. 
The trial court entered a minute entry decision dated 
September 8, 1992. Pursuant to that minute entry, the court made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an order in re: 
contempt and restraining order, all entered on or about September 
11, 1992. The defendant subsequently moved the court for an 
3 
order relieving him from the order of September 11, 1992. The 
trial court denied defendant's motion for relief from judgment on 
September 25, 1992. Finally, a money judgment against the 
defendant for plaintiff's court costs and attorney's fees was 
entered on October 6, 1992. 
The defendant moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to relieve him from the 
effects of the order in re: contempt and restraining order, which 
motion was subsequently denied. This motion has no effect on the 
pendency of this appeal, and is in fact part of this appeal. 
There is no motion pending pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 
52(b), 54(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT QF Tflff FACTS 
Plaintiff is the former husband of a woman, one Michael 
Donnelly, f.k.a. Michael Hanson. Defendant Donnelly is now 
married to Michael Donnelly, and has been her husband during all 
times relevant to this appeal. Plaintiff and Michael Donnelly 
have a child, Trevor, with whom plaintiff is entitled to exercise 
visitation. The child resides with his mother and Donnelly. 
The plaintiff filed this action below seeking a restraining 
order against the defendant. A temporary restraining order was 
signed by the trial court on April 23, 1992, and served upon 
defendant on the same day. That restraining order was heard 
before the court on May 1, 1992. As a result of that temporary 
4 
restraining order and hearing, another order also entitled 
"Temporary Restraining Order" (which is, in fact, a permanent 
injunction) was entered on June 5, 1992. This second "Temporary 
hereafter referred to as the "June 5th Order." 
The June 5th Order restrained and enjoined the defendant as 
follows: 
1. Defendant is enjoined and restrained 
a. from in any manner interfering 
his right [sic] to visit the minor 
child, Trevor, or to communicate 
with the minor child's mother to 
arrange visitation; and 
b. from in any manner arguing, 
[sic] harassing, or confronting the 
Plaintiff with the use of 
insulting, derogatory or abusive 
language when the Plaintiff picks 
up and returns his minor child for 
the purpose of exercising 
Plaintiff's right of visitation or 
at any other time; and 
c. from in any manner making 
demeaning remarks about the 
Plaintiff in the presence of the 
minor child or others. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to act 
reasonably in the presence of each other. (R.O.A. 
42, 43.) (emphasis added) 
On June 5th, 1992, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order 
in re: contempt and notice, together with a supporting affidavit. 
The affidavit was dated May 26, 1992. It alleged that the 
defendant was in contempt of court. Specifically, plaintiff 
alleged in this affidavit that on Memorial Day, May 25th, 1992, 
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". . . the Defendant attempted to intimidate the plaintiff by 
opening the front door of defendant's home and stepping onto the 
front porch and positioning himself physically near the Plaintiff 
indicating his intention to take the child from the Plaintiff, 
and when the Defendant left the premises where the child resides, 
the Defendant followed the Plaintiff toward the Plaintiff's car, 
again in a threatening manner." (R.O.A. 40) The plaintiff's 
allegations came on for a trial on June 29, 1992. The court 
heard the testimony of the plaintiff, Donnelly, Michael Donnelly, 
and others, and subsequently entered the orders which are the 
subject of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in entering its orders herein as 
follows: 
1. The trial court erred in finding the defendant to be in 
contempt of court based on the testimony at the trial held June 
29, 1992. Specifically, the trial court erred in the following 
particulars: 
a. Some of the conduct for which the defendant was found 
in contempt allegedly occurred on May 25, 1992. The order 
of the court which the defendant was found to have violated 
was not entered until June 5, 1992, over ten days after the 
defendant's contemptuous conduct is alleged to have 
occurred. Defendant cannot be found in contempt, under the 
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facts and circumstances of this case, on the basis of an 
oral ruling in open court made May 1, 1992, and an order 
entered after he committed the acts for which he was found 
in contempt; and 
b. The trial court's ruling from the bench on May 1, 1992, 
which was embodied in the June 5th Order, contains a 
requirement that the defendant "act reasonably." It is this 
provision of the June 5th Order, for violation of which the 
defendant was found in contempt. This order is so vague in 
its language that it is not possible for the defendant to 
know his duty under the court order or to conform his 
actions to the order, because it is impossible for him to 
know exactly what behavior is prohibited. 
c. Defendant was not given adequate notice of what issues 
would be tried to the court on June 29, 1992. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
relieve the defendant from the order finding him to be in 
contempt, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 1, above. 
3. The trial court erred in ordering the defendant to pay 
plaintiff attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000.00 as a sanction 
for contempt, for reason that no contempt had occurred in the 
first instance. 
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ARGUMENT: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE 
DEFENDANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
It is the law in the state of Utah that a person may be held 
in contempt of court for a violation of a court's order if three 
conditions are satisfied. First of all, the party must have 
known of the duty imposed by the court's order. Second, the 
party must have had the ability to comply with the court order. 
Finally, the party must have wilfully and knowingly refused to 
comply with the court order. Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association v. Labrum, supra. 
A. THERE WAS NO ORDER IN PLACE FROM WHICH CONTEMPT 
COULD BE FOUND AT THE TIME DEFENDANT IS ALLEGED TO HAVE 
COMMITTED HIS ACTS OF CONTEMPT. 
As noted above, this entire proceeding between the parties 
was commenced by the filing of a complaint and a temporary 
restraining order signed April 23, 1992. 
As a matter of law, that temporary restraining order expired 
by its own terms within ten days of the date of the order, or on 
May 3, 1992. The language of the first restraining order, 
itself, indicates that the restraining order expires 
automatically. The order states as follows: "This Order shall 
expire by it's [sic] terms within 10 days unless, during said 
time, it is extended for a like period or unless the party 
against whom the Order is directed consents that it may be 
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extended for a longer period." (R.O.A. 17) 
This original temporary restraining order was heard on May 
1, 1992. The trial court made an oral ruling. This ruling was 
not embodied in an order of the court, however, until plaintiff's 
counsel prepared an order and submitted it to the court. This 
order was ultimately signed on June 5, 1992. 
In the interim, during the Memorial Day weekend, 1992, the 
defendant allegedly committed certain acts at his home while 
plaintiff was picking up his child for visitation. It is these 
actions allegedly committed during the Memorial Day weekend which 
gave rise to the motion for contempt in this case. 
There was no court order in effect on May 25, 1992, for 
violation of which the defendant could be found in contempt. The 
prior restraining order, by its own terms, had expired. The 
subsequent ordered was not entered until 11 days after May 25th. 
The defendant cannot be found in contempt of an order which did 
not exist. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HEARING EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT, OTHER THAN THAT WHICH WAS 
IDENTIFIED IN THE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND AFFIDAVIT. 
The plaintiff, in his motion for finding of contempt and his 
supporting affidavit, identified one particular day upon which 
defendant was alleged to have committed actions constituting 
contempt of court. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the 
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defendant was in contempt for his conduct on May 25, 1992. 
(R.O.A. 39, 40, 41) 
However, during the trial of this action, the plaintiff was 
permitted to testify regarding incidents which occurred on 
several other dates. (Tr. 6-29-92, p.13-16.) Ultimately, the 
trial court used evidence of the defendant's conduct on these 
other dates to find defendant in contempt. Specifically, in 
paragraphs 12 and 13 of the court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered on September 11, 1992, the court makes 
reference to the defendant's conduct on June 20, 1992, and June 
21, 1992. (R.O.A. 90) 
Defendant went to trial in this matter believing that he had 
to defend himself only against charges that he was in contempt 
for conduct on May 25, 1992. However, evidence came before the 
court regarding incidents on June 20th and June 21st, 1992, as 
well. Defendant was ultimately held in contempt for his conduct 
on all three of these dates. 
The failure to give defendant notice that he would be tried 
for contempt for actions which occurred on June 20th and June 
21st, violated the defendant's right to due process. He was not 
given notice of the contempt charges against him and a fair 
opportunity to defend against those charges. For this reason, 
the court's contempt findings are contrary to law. 
Further, defendant was never served personally with a notice 
of trial about contempt. He was served via counsel, only, 
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(R.O.A. 36#38). There is no indication in the file that 
defendant was ever served the supporting affidavit, even through 
counsel. 
C. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CAPABLE OF KNOWING WHAT THE 
COURT ORDER WAS OR OF CONFORMING HIS CONDUCT TO THE 
TERMS OF THE ORDER. 
As noted above, two of the three requirements for a court's 
finding of contempt are a finding that the defendant knew of the 
duty imposed by the court's order, and had the ability to comply 
with the order. Given the language of the order for which the 
defendant has been found in contempt, neither of these two 
requirements is satisfied. 
The defendant was found in contempt of the requirement that 
he "act reasonably." He has not been found in contempt of any of 
the more specific requirements set forth in the June 5th Order. 
The June 5th Order specifically restrained defendant from 
interfering with plaintiff's rights of visitation or from 
communicating with the minor child's mother regarding visitation. 
It also restrained defendant from arguing with, harassing or 
confronting the plaintiff with the use of insulting, derogatory 
or abusive language when the plaintiff picks up and returns the 
child for purposes of visitation. The June 5th Order restrained 
the defendant from making any demeaning remarks about the 
plaintiff in the presence of the minor child or others. Finally, 
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it ordered defendant to "act reasonably." (R.O.A. 43) 
The findings of fact entered on September 11, 1992, in 
support of the trial court's contempt order do not contain any 
finding that the defendant had violated any of the more specific 
requirements of the June 5th Order. The court does not make any 
finding that the defendant stopped the plaintiff from exercising 
visitation or communicating with his child's mother, and there is 
no finding that the defendant used any language to argue with or 
demean or intimidate the plaintiff, as proscribed by the June 5th 
Order. 
Instead, the findings of fact which putatively support the 
contempt order are to the effect that the defendant stood within 
eighteen inches to two feet of the plaintiff while the child was 
exchanged for visitation, walked behind plaintiff to escort the 
plaintiff off defendant's property, and made a hand gesture to 
the plaintiff which only the plaintiff and defendant could see. 
These findings do not support a finding of contempt for 
violation of the more specific requirements of the June 5th 
Order. The only possible basis left for the court's order is the 
catch-all language that defendant was to "act reasonably." 
The requirement that a party "act reasonably" is such a 
vague and non-specific requirement that it did not put defendant 
on notice of what specific conduct was expected of him. He was 
not put on notice of how to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the court. To "act reasonably" is such a broad 
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concept that the definition of this phrase will vary from citizen 
to citizen. 
The order from which the finding of contempt flows is simply 
too non-specific for the defendant either to understand what duty 
the court has imposed upon him or how he can conform his conduct 
to the order of the court. Defendant cannot be found in 
contempt, as a matter of law. 
D. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT TO MAKE A FINDING OF CONTEMPT. 
The trial court had a duty to find, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that defendant was in contempt of court. Salzettir 
supra. Therefore, the trial court had to find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that each and every one of the three 
elements of contempt had been satisfied. Absent clear and 
convincing evidence of each of the three elements of contempt, 
the lower court cannot be sustained on appeal. 
Upon review, this court must first determine whether the 
underlying order was lawful. This is the challenge made by 
defendant to the order in the previous point of argument. If the 
court should determine that the underlying order is lawful, then 
this court must still determine whether defendant's conduct in 
violating the order constituted contempt of court. Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association v. Labrum. supra. Defendant has 
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the burden of demonstrating in this appeal that, viewed in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's finding, the evidence 
at trial was insufficient to support the trial court's findings. 
Labrum, supra. In the instant case, the evidence was not 
adequate to support the trial court findings. Most certainly, 
the evidence at the June 29th trial was inadequate to support a 
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant was 
in contempt. 
A review of the plaintiff's testimony in support of his 
allegation that defendant was in contempt shows that the 
plaintiff simply did not like to be around the defendant. 
Plaintiff viewed all defendant's conduct from a perspective that 
it was demeaning of or threatening to plaintiff. However, when 
the plaintiff's testimony about the defendant's conduct is viewed 
from an objective perspective, it is clear that the defendant's 
conduct did not constitute contempt. Certainly, there is not 
clear and convincing evidence that his conduct was contemptuous. 
Plaintiff admitted at the outset of his testimony that he 
viewed all the defendant's conduct during the incidents in 
question from a perspective and expectation that defendant would 
behave badly. Plaintiff testified about defendant reaching out 
to take the child at the conclusion of visitation as follows: 
Q. How is it intimidating for him to reach 
his hand out to take the child? 
A. Based on the previous experience that I 
had had with him, the hostility that he had 
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demonstrated earlier; he came at me out of 
the door with the same expression on his 
face. The same intimidating, hostile 
presence and demeanor, extended his arms. . . 
(Tr., 6-29-92, p.26 11. 19-25.) 
It is clear from this testimony that the plaintiff expects 
the worst of all defendant's conduct, even when that conduct is 
as innocent as reaching out to pick up a child. 
Plaintiff was intimidated and upset by defendant's conduct 
of answering the doorbell at defendant's own residence, stepping 
on his own front porch, and watching the plaintiff drive away. 
The plaintiff testified as follows: 
. . . I got in my car, and he stood at the 
end of his porch with his arms folded, as I 
backed out the driveway and left. 
Q. . . . As you exited the residence and he 
followed you; what was the proximity between 
the two of you? 
A. At the door, he was probably eighteen 
inches or two feet, and as I left the porch, 
he was probably, I would guess, maybe eight 
feet - - eight to ten feet behind me. 
Q. But he followed you out to your car? 
A. Well, he followed me to my car. He 
followed me out, then he stopped at the end 
of his porch and stood with his arms folded 
as I drove off the driveway. (Tr. 6-29-92, 
p.11 11.1-13.) 
Again, the plaintiff's perspective is so colored by his own 
paranoia that he describes being afraid of defendant answering 
the door, and defendant watching him drive away from defendant's 
home with his arms folded. Absolutely nothing about the 
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defendant's objective behavior, described by the plaintiff, 
constitutes contempt of court. All of the plaintiff's feeling of 
intimidation is subjective. He describes this sensation as 
follows: 
A. I think as a gesture, I think as he 
stood at the door and he stepped out the 
door, the look on his face was very 
threatening, very intimidating, very hostile. 
As I stepped off the porch, he walked behind 
me. I turned around and looked at him. He 
stood at the porch with his arms folded. He 
still had the same threatening demeanor about 
him. (Tr. 6-29-92, p.11 11.19-25.) 
Plaintiff also testified about incidents which occurred on 
Saturday, June 20, 1992 and Sunday, June 21, 1992. Again, 
plaintiff describes objectively acceptable behavior from his own 
subjective and paranoid state of mind, to attempt to prove the 
defendant was in contempt of court. Plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
. . . I got - - I parked on the driveway, got 
Trevor, and took him to the door. I rang the 
doorbell. The door opened and both Tony and 
Michael came out of the house and stood at 
the doorstep. And I, again, took a step 
back. I gave Trevor to his mother. 
And again, Mr. Donnelly's presence was that 
same glare, that same intimidating demeanor. 
And uh - - I gave Trevor to his mother, 
turned around and walked back to my car. . . 
Q. How close to you did Mr. Donnelly 
position himself on this occasion? 
A. Well, again, it was eighteen inches to 
two feet. (Tr. 6-29-92, p.15 1.13 - p.16 
1.1.) 
16 
The only conduct which defendant describes which might 
potentially be interpreted as an act of aggression is described 
by the plaintiff as occurring on June 20, 1992. Plaintiff 
testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: He was standing inside his 
garage, which, the garage door was open. And 
there were two cars inside the garage. He 
was standing inside the garage and didn't 
appear to be doing anything but looking at me 
as I approached the porch. And again, with 
just kind of a glare. 
I picked up Trevor, took him out to the 
car, and put him inside the car. I looked 
back at the garage, and Mr. Donnelly was 
still standing inside the garage, glaring at 
me, motionless. 
I backed down the driveway, turned 
around and headed right straight away from 
the driveway. And when I looked in my 
rearview mirror, I saw Mr. Donnelly emerge 
from the garage. He stood at the opening of 
the garage. He held his arms up, wrapped one 
hand - -
Q. . . . Would you state to the court to 
the best of your memory, the motion? 
A. He went like this (indicating) at me, as 
I was driving away. And my impression was 
that he was simulating holding a gun — 
pointing a gun at me as I drove away. And I 
observed this in the rearview mirror. (Tr. 
6-29-92, p.14 11.6-25.) 
The best example the plaintiff can give of any objective 
nature about the defendant's contemptuous conduct is a gesture 
which the plaintiff assumes represents holding a gun, which he 
observes in his rearview mirror pulling out of a driveway. The 
Court must consider this testimony, as to its believability and 
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the bias of the witness. This is certainly not evidence of such 
a clear and convincing nature as to sustain a contempt finding. 
Even if defendant acted exactly as described by plaintiff, 
the conduct does not violate any specific restriction set forth 
in the June 5th Order. Defendant was never restrained from 
gesturing at plaintiff. 
Defendant's wife, Michael Donnelly, gave a perfectly 
rational explanation for defendant's conduct, in her testimony 
about these episodes. She testified as follows: 
Q. And isn't it a fair statement that on 
that occasion Tony positioned himself close 
to Steve as the child was returned? . . . 
Answer yes or no. 
A. No. I'm not going to say that, because 
our front porch is very small. There's not 
much room for all four of us to be out there. 
Q. I understand. Knowing that that porch 
was small, do you know of any reason why Tony 
would even be at the front door, knowing that 
Steve was returning Trevor, on that day and 
at that hour? 
A. Yes, because I do not feel comfortable 
being alone at any time with Steve at all. 
Q. I see. 
A. I never have. He has harassed me and 
intimidated me for the last seven years, and 
I don't feel comfortable with - - I feel more 
comfortable with Tony present. Nothing was 
said, and Steve handed me the child and 
turned around and walked away. And no words 
were said between Tony and Steve. The most 
we say is hi and goodbye. That's about it. 
(Tr. 6-29-92, p.62 11.1-25.) 
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The plaintiff himself admitted at trial that, after the 
entry of the first temporary restraining order, there were no 
threatening or inappropriate statements made by defendant to 
plaintiff. Plaintiff testified as follows: 
A. Uh - - with the exception of, there were 
no verbal remarks made on the 25th of May. 
There were on the 18th of April. And other 
then that, his demeanor was pretty much the 
same. Threatening and intimidating. (Tr. 6-
29-92, p.12 11,8-11.) 
When all of the evidence is marshalled and reviewed, it is 
clear from the trial transcript that the plaintiff is simply 
paranoid about the defendant, and that no conduct on the part of 
the defendant, save total absence, would satisfy the plaintiff. 
However, total absence from his own home was specifically not 
required defendant of by the court's June 5th Order. There was 
also no restriction in the June 5th Order, regarding how close 
the defendant could come to the plaintiff's person. 
There is no factual basis for finding that defendant was in 
contempt of court. Certainly, there is no basis to make such a 
finding by clear and convincing evidence. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. 
Because there was never any basis for a finding of contempt 
against the defendant in the first place, the trial court erred 
in failing to relieve the defendant from that judgment and order 
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of contempt, when the error of the court was called to the 
court's attention. The trial court should have granted the 
defendant's motion for relief from the contempt order. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE PLAINTIFF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In the judgment entered on October 6, 1992, the trial court 
awarded the plaintiff a judgment against defendant for $1,000.00, 
representing plaintiff's attorney's fees. This judgment for 
attorney's fees was awarded solely on the basis that defendant 
was in contempt of court. These attorney's fees were for 
plaintiff's damages for defendant's contempt. 
However, because the finding of contempt must fail, the 
award of attorney's fees predicated upon that contempt must also 
fail. The defendant should be relieved of the judgment for 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order of 
contempt should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded 
for a finding that the defendant was not in contempt of court. 
Further, the judgment entered against defendant for attorney's 
fees should be vacated. Finally, this matter should be remanded 
for the trial court to make a determination regarding an award of 
attorney's fees to defendant for this appeal. 
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22-RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of December, 1992. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY/C-r CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the defendant/appellant 
herein, and that I caused the foregoing APPEAL BRIEF to be served 
upon plaintiff/respondent by placing <fuJti true and correct copies 
of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
THOMAS BLONQUIST 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the _ ^ L r day of /%Z£ esn b&^ , 1992. 
MART C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER and 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
(dated April 23, 1992) 
N 
i Thomas R. Blonguist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TONY DONNELLY, 
Defendant. 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ^ 
Civil No. ^/SMfs? C(/ 
Judge: fooZ^ 
Having read and considered the Verified Complaint on file 
herein and Plaintiff's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining 
Order and Order to Show Cause, without notice, and it appearing 
that the reguirements of Rule 65A.(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures have been met in that over the past three years the 
Plaintiff and his former wife have, without incident, arranged for 
visitation by the Plaintiff with his son but that since March 28, 
1992 the Defendant has interfered with Plaintiff's rights of 
visitation by issuing a unilateral schedule of visitation and 
informing the Plaintiff that those are the only times that he will 
be able to see his son, that the Defendant has used vulgar and vile 
language and made unprovoked movements which appear to the 
Plaintiff to be suggestive of Defendant's intention to physically 
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strike the Plaintiff and that during all conversations between the 
parties, the Defendant's demeanor is belligerent, hostile, 
threatening and abusive to the Plaintiff. 
And it further appearing to the Court that over the past three 
years, the Plaintiff has visited his son one evening per week and 
weekends and that this schedule has been unilaterally altered by 
the Defendant. 
Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the Defendant be and he is hereby enjoined and restrained 
a. from in any manner interfering with Plaintiff's right to 
visit the minor child or communicate with the minor child's mother 
to arrange visitation; 
b. from in any manner communicating with the Plaintiff or 
being within 200 feet of the premises where the Plaintiff may 
reside or be employed or being within 50 feet of the Plaintiff or 
his property when he picks up and returns his minor child, Trevor, 
for the purposes of exercising Plaintiff's rights of visitation or 
at any other time; and, 
c. from in any manner making demeaning remarks about 
Plaintiff in the presence of the minor child or others. 
This Order shall be issued by the Clerk of the above entitled 
Court upon the giving of security by the Plaintiff in the sum of 
2 
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It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant be 
and appear before the above entitled Court, 240 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on the \ day of May, 1992 at M o'clock 
_4_.m. to show cause, if any he has, why the Order should not 
continue during the pendencey of this action. 
This Order shall expire by it's terms within 10 days unless, 
during said time, it is extended for a like period or unless the 
party against whom the Order is directed consents that it may be 
extended for a longer period. 
DATED this >~ xdav of April, 1992 
ISSUED THiq </p DAY OF APRIL, 1992 
AT \VSM5, 
CLERK OF COURT 
f% ^ 
BY <_ 
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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
(dated June 5, 1992) 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TONY DONNELLY, ] 
Defendant. 
) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
) Civil No. 920902292CV 
i Judge Frank G. Noel 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on for hearing before the 
above entitled Court on the 1st day of May, 1992 at 9:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff was represented by his attorney of record, Thomas R. 
Blonquist and the Defendant was represented by H. Don Sharp, 
Esquire. The Court heard the arguments of counsel and having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein and otherwise being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the Temporary Restraining 
Order issued in the above entitled matter on April 23, 1992 shall 
continue in full force and effect during the pendency of the above 
entitled matter as follows: 
1. Defendant is hereby enjoined and restrained 
a. from in any manner interfering his right to visit 
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the minor child, Trevor, or communicate with the minor child's 
mother to arrange visitation; and, 
b. from in any manner arguing, harassing or confronting 
the Plaintiff with the use of insulting, derogatory or abusive 
language when the Plaintiff picks up and returns his minor child 
for the purposes of exercising Plaintiff's right of visitation or 
at any other time; and, 
c. from in any manner making demeaning remarks about 
the Plaintiff in the presence of the minor child or others. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to act reasonably 
in the presence of each other. 
DATED this ^ day of ^ fey7l992. 
BY THE COURT 
Frank G. Noel, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to H. Don Sharp, Esq. 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401 this JJBLTday pf J*ay, 1992. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(in support of September 11, 1992 order) 
ii'fr«i / r ! c r District 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, ; 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
TONY DONNELLY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
| Civil No. 920902292CV 
i Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, on the 29th day of June, 1992 
commencing at 9:40 a.m. pursuant to the Motion of Plaintiff for an 
Order in re Contempt. Plaintiff was present and represented by 
Thomas R. Blonquist, his attorney of record, and the Defendant was 
present with his attorney, H. Don Sharp. Witnesses were called and 
testified under direct and cross examination, exhibits were 
received in evidence and the matter was argued and submitted to the 
Court for decision. The Court, having heard and considered the 
evidence received and the statements and arguments of counsel and 
otherwise being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor, now makes and enters it's 
SEP 1 1 1S92 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant is married to Plaintiff's former wife. 
2. In the Decree of Divorce that dissolved the bonds of 
matrimony between Plaintiff and his former wife, she was awarded 
the care, custody and control of the parties7 minor child, Trevor, 
and Plaintiff was awarded reasonable and liberal rights of 
visitation. 
3. On or about April 18, 1992 Defendant informed Plaintiff 
that all future arrangements for visitation must be made through 
him. 
4. The above entitled matter was instituted by the Plaintiff 
seeking an Order enjoining the Defendant from in any manner 
communicating with the Plaintiff or being within 200 feet of the 
premises where the Plaintiff resides or is employed or being within 
50 feet of the Plaintiff or his property when he picks up and 
returns Trevor for the purpose of exercising Plaintiff's rights of 
visitation. 
5. Plaintiff is also seeking an Order enjoining the 
Defendant from in any manner making demeaning remarks about the 
Plaintiff in the presence of Trevor or others. 
6. On April 23, 1992, a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Order to Show Cause were issued requiring the Defendant to appear 
on the 1st day of May at 9:00 a.m. and show cause why the Temporary 
2 
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Restraining Order should not be made permanent during the pendency 
of the action. 
7. On said date and time, the Defendant appeared with 
counsel and the parties presented their statements, arguments and 
proffers to the Court. 
8. The primary concern expressed by the Defendant at the 
hearing was that a requirement that he not be within 50 feet of the 
Plaintiff or his property when Plaintiff picks up and returns 
Trevor for purposes of exercising Plaintiff's right of visitation 
would require the Defendant to leave his home. 
9. After considering the matter, the Court informed the 
Defendant that if what was stated in the Plaintiff's Affidavit was 
true, his conduct was improper, that while there should be a 
sufficient distance between Plaintiff and Defendant to avoid future 
problems, it was not the Court's desire to require the Defendant to 
remove himself from his home when the Plaintiff picked up and 
delivered Trevor for visitation, that the Court did not want there 
to be any further problems between the parties and, believing that 
the parties understood the Court's position in this matter, ordered 
that the Plaintiff and the Defendant conduct themselves reasonably 
in the presence of each other and entered such an Order on the 5th 
day of June, 1992. 
10. On the 25th day of May, while the Plaintiff was returning 
3 
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Trevor after exercising visitation, the Defendant placed himself in 
the doorway of the residence approximately 18 inches to 2 feet from 
the Plaintiff and when the Plaintiff left the residence, the 
Defendant followed him, in close proximity, to the edge of the 
Defendant's porch. 
11. While on the porch standing near the Plaintiff, the 
Defendant, through his gestures, was threatening, intimidating and 
hostile toward the Plaintiff. 
12. On June 20, 199 2 the Plaintiff went to the Defendant's 
residence to pick up Trevor and when he left, the Defendant emerged 
from the garage, stood at the opening thereof and simulated holding 
a gun pointed at the Plaintiff's automobile. 
13. On the 21st day of June, 1992 when Plaintiff was 
returning Trevor after visitation, the Defendant was on the porch 
of the residence within 18 inches to two feet of the Plaintiff, 
where he glared at Plaintiff with an intimidating demeanor and 
presence. 
14. On the 25th of May and the 20th of June, 1992 both the 
parties to this action were aware that there was bad blood and a 
feeling of hostility between them. 
15. Defendant had knowledge of the times of day on the 25th 
day of May and the 20th day of June that Plaintiff was going to be 
at the Defendant's residence in connection with exercising his 
4 
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visitation with Trevor. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Prior to May 25, 1992, the Defendant was aware that 
because of his request, the requirement that he not be within 50 
feet of the Plaintiff had been modified and the Court had ordered 
that there should be a substantial distance between the parties to 
avoid future problems and that the parties were ordered to conduct 
themselves reasonably in the presence of each other. 
2. Having knowledge that the Plaintiff was scheduled to come 
to the Defendant's residence in connection with visiting Trevor, 
the Defendant knowingly and intentionally placed himself within 18 
inches to 2 feet of the Plaintiff and, with body language, 
threatened the Plaintiff. 
3. The conduct of the Defendant on May 25 and June 20, 1992 
was in violation of the Order of the Court entered in this matter 
on the 5th day of June, 1992. 
4. Based upon the conduct of the Defendant, it is reasonable 
that he be held in contempt, fined $100 and ordered to pay 
Plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in connection with the 
contempt proceedings. 
5. The Order dated June 5, 1992 should be modified to 
5 
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require that the Defendant not be within 50 feet of the Plaintiff 
when he comes to pick up and return Trevor for visitation but the 
Order should not require the Defendant to leave his home. 
DATED this // day of September, 1992. _^ 
BY THE COURT \^Z»~*<S4th 
Frank G. Noel /V'gjitfgeV^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 310 South 
Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT 8410jL^this 
1992. 
day of September, 
/
 afaomafe RXBlonquist 
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ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT 
(dated September 11, 1992) 
SEP 1 1 1S92 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
TONY DONNELLY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT 
) and RESTRAINING ORDER 
| Civil No. 920902292CV 
I Judge Frank G. Noel 
Having heretofore made and entered it's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now, in accordance therewith, and upon the 
Motion of the Plaintiff and good cause appearing therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to 
§78-32-1(5), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) Defendant be 
and he is hereby held in contempt of Court for his willful and 
knowing disobedience of the Order entered in the above entitled 
matter on the 5th day of June, 1992; pursuant to §78-32-10 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended), Defendant is ordered to pay a 
fine in the sum of $100 and pursuant to §78-34-11 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff 
such sum as is sufficient to indemnify him for reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in connection with this contempt proceeding• 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant 
be and he is hereby restrained from being within 50 feet of the 
Defendant when he picks up and delivers Trevor to exercise 
visitation, however, if the Defendant is in his residence when this 
occurs, he is not required to leave the same but must be in another 
room or in a separate area of the home to provide sufficient 
distance between the Parties so that there will be no further 
confrontations between them whatsoever. 
DATED this IL day of September, 1992 
BY THE COURT 
Frank G. Noel, Judge ^ -^V/ J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 310 South 
Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 this 
1992. 
"day of September, 
bmas R/^lonquist 
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
TONY DONNELLY, ] 
Defendant. 
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
) and REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
) Civil No. 920902292CV 
i Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment was filed pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Defendant's Motion after which a Notice to Submit 
for Decision and Request for Ruling was filed by the Defendant. 
The Court, having reviewed the Motion together with a response 
thereto and having ruled on the said Motion and made a Minute Entry 
setting forth said ruling, now, being fully advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefor 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for Oral Argument be 
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and the same are hereby denied. 
DATED this day of September, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
Frank G. Noel, Judge"-,; 
MAILING CERTIFICATE ^ ^ ^ ^ 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 310 South 
Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT 84lathis 
1992. 
KL day of September, 
-2-
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JUDGMENT 
(dated October 6, 1992) 
OCT 0 6 1S92 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
(0369) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TONY DONNELLY, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920902292CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Having heretofore made and entered it's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions and Order in re Contempt and Restraining Order and now 
having reviewed the Affidavit of Plaintiff's attorney relative to 
contempt proceeding fees and otherwise being fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff be 
and he is hereby awarded Judgment against the Defendant in the sum 
Of v2,12b-« as and for the Plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with the contempt proceedings in the above entitled 
action. 
DATED this 10 day of SeptGItftfer, 199?, 
oJK 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to Mary C. Corporon, Esq., 
310 South Main, #1400, Salt Lake City, UT^ 84101 this 
September, 1992. 
JS* day of 
Thomas R 
/ 
onquist 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
O ov 
7> O u
 Go 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
F'LrD 
J)l37R!C^C0URT 
OCT 9 4 35 PH '92 
Thl' ..STRICT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
STEVEN MARK HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TONY DONNELLY, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil NO. 920902292 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
DEFENDANT TO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION, by and through his 
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby appeals the order in 
re: contempt and restraining order entered in the above-entitled 
action. 
DATED THIS ^7 day of £)C -h36e^— 1992. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY,^ CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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